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Abstract—This paper presents two Identity-Based Blind
Signature (IBBS) schemes based on bilinear pairings. Both
of them enjoy the following features. First, they achieve the
optimal bound of round complexity for blind signatures,
i.e., each signature can be blindly generated with one round
(or two moves) of message exchanges between the signature
requesting user and signer. Second, their security is proved
without the ROS assumption, which assumes that it is
infeasible to find an overdetermined, solvable system of
linear equations modulo q with random inhomogenities. Due
to this reason, the order of underlying group does not need
to be very large any more, as compared to the previous work.
Third, the key extraction algorithm used is the most popular
one in ID-based cryptography. In fact, the proposed two
constructions are first IBBS schemes enjoying all the above
advantages. Different from other IBBS schemes, these two
IBBS schemes are constructed from scratch in the sense that
new ID-based signature schemes are customized and new
assumptions (e.g., two versions of one-more bilinear Diffie-
Hellman inversion assumption) are formalized. We also show
that the new ID-based schemes and new assumptions may
have other interesting applications.
Index Terms—Provable security, Identity-based signature,
Blind signature , Bilinear pairing, ROS assumption
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Shamir [34] introduced the concept of identity-
based (ID-based for short) public key cryptosystems in
which a user’s public key can be easily derived from his
identity by applying a publicly available function, while
his private key can only be calculated for him by a trusted
authority, called Private Key Generator (PKG). ID-based
cryptosystems are a good alternative for conventional
public key primitives working in certificate-based public
key infrastructure (PKI). In 2000, Joux [26] used the
Weil pairing to construct the first one-round tripartite
This work is partially supported by National Natural Science Foun-
dation of China (No. 60973135, 60970111,61202475) and Humanities
and Social Science Research Project of the Ministry of Education
(11YJCZH039).This work was partly presented at the conference of
Pairing 2008 [22] and is significantly extended and improved here.
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. In 2001, Boneh
and Franklin [2] presented the first ID-based encryption
scheme from bilinear pairings. Since then, in the so-
called identity-based cryptography field, many ID-based
cryptographic schemes have been proposed [14], [18] and
bilinear pairing has become the most popular tool for
constructing ID-based cryptography.
Blind signature, introduced by Chaum in 1982 [13], is
a variant of digital signatures, in which a user can get
a signature from a signer without revealing the message
signed to the signer. Blind signatures play an important
role in many security applications, such as e-cash and e-
voting, where privacy is crucial. In security, they should
satisfy blindness and unforgeability. Informally, blindness
requires that the signer’s view during signing process and
the resulting signature should be statistically independent.
Unforgeability can be formalized as one-more forgery
under a parallel attack in [32]: the attacker cannot output
l + 1 signatures, if it interacts in parallel with the signer
no more than l times. In 2001, Bellare et al. [5] proved
the security of the Chaum’s RSA-based blind signature
scheme in the random oracle model under the novel “one-
more-RSA-inversion” assumption. In 2003, Boldyreva
proposed a blind signature scheme based on pairing and
proved its security under the one-more computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption [8]. In 2001, Schnorr
[35] showed that the Schnorr’s blind signature scheme
is provably secure under the ROS assumption (refer to
Definition 6) in the generic group model [19] and the
random oracle model [7]. Unfortunately, at Crypto 2002
Wagner [36] showed that there is a subexponential time
algorithm to break the ROS-problem. Consequently, a
group of order q > 21600 may be needed for ensur-
ing 80-bit security. Furthermore, the ROS assumption is
not related to the well known discrete logarithm (DL)
assumption, although the latter is necessary for DL-
based signature schemes. In addition, round complexity
is also an important factor for an blind signature scheme,
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especially for some applications like e-voting and e-cash.
One round (i.e. two moves) is the optimal bound of round
complexity. Namely, to generate a signature blindly at
least two messages must be exchanged between the signer
and signature requesting user. In fact, there are a few
PKI-based blind signature schemes [8], [13], [20], [28]
with round-optimal signature generation protocols. Hence,
the one-round blind signature scheme without ROS as-
sumption, such as Boldyreva’s blind signature scheme,
are more desirable than Schonorr’s blind signature scheme
which requires 3 moves of communication and the ROS
assumption.
The combination of the two above concepts, ID-based
cryptography and blind signatures, results in the concept
of ID-based blind signature (IBBS) schemes. Roughly
speaking, the existing IBBS schemes can be divided into
two classes. We note that the first class including the
results in [24], [25], [37], [38] are similar to the Schnorr’s
blind signature scheme as follwos: (1) The underlying ID-
based signature schemes (or Schonrr signature scheme)
can be seen as modularly transformed from identity-based
identification (or Schnorr Identification scheme) using
the Fiat-Shamir trnasform [3]; (2) These IBBS schemes
can be seen as constructed based on the corresponding
identity-based signature scheme using the well formalized
techniques [33] to construct the Schnorr blind signature
scheme. As a result of this similarity, like Schnorr’s
blind signature scheme, their security has to rely on the
generic group model and the ROS assumption, in addition
to the random oracle model and the discrete logarithm
assumption. On the other hand, all of the aforementioned
IBBS schemes require two rounds (more specifically,
three moves) of message exchange between the signer
and the user.
The other class of IBBS schemes is due to Galindo
et al’s generic transformation [21], which transforms a
standard blind signature scheme into an ID-based blind
signature scheme. The main idea is a folklore and can be
traced back to Shamir [34] and Bellare et al [3]. We briefly
review this approach as follows. The PKG first selects a
key pair (ski, pki) for a signer IDi, issues a certificate
Certi to certify the string IDi||pki by using the PKG’s
PKI-based private key, and then forwards (ski, Certi) to
the signer IDi. To get an ID-based blind signature, a user
first enquires the signer IDi for its Certi and checks the
validity of Certi. If this procedure is successful, the user
and the signer can engage in the standard blind signature
issuing protocol to output a signature σ for a message m
under the public key pki. The final ID-based signature is
a pair (σ,Certi), which is valid if Certi is a certificate
for IDi together with some public key pki issued by
the PKG, and σ is a valid signature for message m with
respect to pki.
Although this work is a very interesting result of ID-
based signatures, there are several restrictions in Galindo
et al.’s approach. (1) It requires that PKG maintain a
directory for all users to avoid issuing two different
private keys for the same user. So the advantage of
ID-based cryptography in simple key management is
somewhat destroyed. (2) If the meaning of “ID-based”
due to Galindo et al. [21] is adopted, traditional PKI-
based signature schemes can also be seen as ID-based
signature schemes [2] and even enjoy better properties.
Here, note that for Galindo et al.’s method, the meaning of
“ID-based” is taken as that the verifier needs to know only
the authority’s public key and the signer’s identity. In this
sense, the PKI-based signature can be seen as “ID-based”,
when the identity is embedded in the certificate and the
public key is included in a signature. On the other hand,
the disadvantage of key escrow problem for ID-based
signature schemes does not work for PKI-based signature
schemes. (3) Under this kind of key extraction method,
the ID-based encryption scheme can never be deployed.
Especially, the key extracting algorithm is completely
different from that for the most popular and somewhat
standard ID-based encryption scheme due to Boneh and
Franklin [2]. Although, in practice, the decryption key and
the signing key could be different, it is usually desirable if
they can be generated and managed by PKG in a unified
form. (4) Galindo et al.’s method somewhat destroys the
most important idea for ID-based cryptography: the public
key of a user can be directly derived from his identity and
therefore digital certificates are avoidable.
In 2009, Phong and Ogata [31] propose a new IBBS
scheme in the standard model based on blind HIBE
schemes. This result is very interesting in theory, because
it is secure in the standard model under the CDH as-
sumption. However, there are oblivious disadvantages in
practice. On one hand, it needs additional rounds of com-
munication for the involved complicated zero knowledge
proof with 21 variables. On the other hand, the length of
the public key is very long, about 25 elements in elliptic
curve group.
So, we are naturally motivated to consider how to
construct one-round IBBS scheme without ROS assump-
tion which, unlike the Galindo et al.’s generic method, is
well suitable for the ID-based setting. In this paper, we
propose two one-round ID-based blind signature schemes
without ROS assumption. They are constructed from
scratch by a way different from the above two classes
of IBBS schemes, i.e., the proposed IBBS schemes rely
on newly formalized computational assumptions and new
basic ID-based signature schemes. More specifically, our
contribution can be summarized as follows. (1) The round
complexity of our IBBS schemes is optimal. Namely, each
interactive signature generation requires the signature
requesting user and the signer to transmit only one mes-
sage to the other. (2) The security proof against generic
parallel attack doesn’t depend on the ROS assumption and
hence the order of underlying group does not need to be
very large any more, as compared to the previous work.
(3) To prove their security, we introduce new plausible
computational assumptions, called two versions of one-
more bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion assumptions (1m-
BDHI-1,1m-BDHI-2, for short). These new assumptions
may be of independent interest, since other recently pro-
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posed computational assumptions in one-more flavor, such
as one-more-RSA-inversion [5], one-more CDH [8], one-
more discrete logarithm [4], have found many applications
in provable security for blind signatures [5], [8], transitive
signatures [4], identification protocols [6] and so on. (4)
Our IBBS schemes avoid the restrictions in the Galindo
et al.’s IBBS scheme as mentioned above. For example,
it is fully “ID-based” in the sense that the public key for
each user can be fixed and publicly generated by anyone
from only the identity information. (5) The underlying ID-
based signature schemes may be of independent interest,
since they avoid using the most popular paradigm of
Fiat-Shamir transform [6] and have a loose algebraic
structure which already allows the efficient extension to
blind signatures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we first review some preliminaries on bilinear pairings
and some computational problems, and then formalize
the 1m-BDHI-1 assumption and 1m-BDHI-2 assumption.
Section 3 deals with the security model of IBBS schemes.
We then present the first IBBS scheme in Section 4, and
prove its security in Section 5. In Section 6, we then
simply present the second IBBS scheme by omitting many
details, as it can be similarly constructed and analyzed
as the first IBBS scheme. After giving a comprehensive
comparison between the proposed constructions and other
IBBS schemes in Section 7, we point out that new
identity-based signatures derived from our IBBS schemes
and the proposed new computational assumptions in one-
more flavor may be of independent interest in Section 8.
Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the definitions of bilinear
pairings and some computational assumptions relative to
the new ones of ours. Then we propose the four new
assumptions of BDHI-1, BDHI-2, 1m-BDHI-1 and 1m-
BHI-2. And we point out the relations between these new
assumptions and some existing assumptions.
Definition 1: Let G1 and G2 be cyclic groups of prime
order q and let P be a generator of G1 (i.e., G1 = 〈P 〉).
Here, G1 is written additively, and G2 multiplicatively. A
map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 is said to be an bilinear pairing
if the following three conditions hold:
(i) e is bilinear, i.e. e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P )ab for
all a, b ∈ Zq;
(ii) e is non-degenerate, i.e. e(P, P ) = 1, where
1 is the identity of group G2;
(iii) e is efficiently computable.
Such a group G1 is called a bilinear group.
Note that throughout this paper, without special de-
scriptions, the groups G1, G2, the prime order q, the
generator P of G1 and the bilinear pairing e are as defined
in the above definition. Next, we review the following
problems with respect to (G1,G2, e, P, q):
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem:
Given random P, aP , bP ∈ G1, output abP ∈ G1,
where a, b ∈R Zq .
• Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem [2]: Given
random P, aP, bP , cP ∈ G1, output e(P, P )abc,
where a, b, c ∈R Zq .
• Generalized Tate Inversion (GTI) Problem [27]:
Given h ∈ G2, find a pair (S, T ) ∈ G1 × G1 such
that e(S, T ) = h, where e : G1 ×G1 → G2 denotes
the Tate pairing.
• Modified Generalized Bilinear Inversion (MGBI)
[1]: Given h ∈ G2 and the generator P ∈ G1, find
a point S ∈ G1 such that e(P, S) = h, where e
denotes the bilinear pairing.
Somewhat like the above GTI and MGBI problems, we
propose two new computational problems as follows.
Definition 2: (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion 1
(BDHI-1) Problem.) Given three random elements
xP, yP, zP ∈ G1 = 〈P 〉, compute two elements S, T ∈
G1 such that e(S, T ) = e(P, P )
xyz , where x, y, z ∈R Zq .
Accordingly, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion 1
(BDHI-1) assumption states that: there is no probabilis-
tic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that can solve the
BDHI-1 problem with non-negligible probability.
Definition 3: (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion 2
(BDHI-2) Problem.) Given three random elements
xP, Y = yP, Z = zP ∈ G1 = 〈P 〉, compute two
elements S, T ∈ G1 such that e(S,Z)e(Y,T ) = e(P, P )xyz ,
where x, y, z ∈R Zq . Accordingly, the Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Inversion 2 (BDHI-2) assumption states that:
there is no PPT algorithm that can solve the BDHI-2
problem with non-negligible probability.
It is obvious that the BDH problem can be solved if
either the BDHI-1 or the BDHI-2 problem can be solved.
And it is also obvious that the BDHI problems can solved
if the CDH problem can be solved. So BDHI-1 (BDHI-2)
assumption is somewhere between CDH assumption and
BDH assumption. That is:
Fact 1: Both BDHI-1 and BDHI-2 assumptions are
weaker than the BDH assumption, but stronger than the
CDH assumption.
Remark 1: However, it is not clear about the relation-
ship between the BDHI-1 assumption and the BDHI-2
assumption.
By extending the assumptions of BDHI-1 and BDHI-
2 to the one-more version, we obtain two new com-
putational assumptions called one-more bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Inversion assumption 1 and 2 (1m-BDHI-1 and
1m-BDHI-2). In fact, there exist many computational
assumptions in the one-more flavor, such as one-more-
RSA-inversion [5], one-more CDH [8], one more discrete
logarithm [4]. These one-more assumptions can be used
to prove security of many cryptographic schemes, such
as the GQ identification scheme [6], blind signature
schemes [4], [8], transitive signatures [5]. Just like the
one-more-RSA-inversion assumption and one-more-CDH
assumption are formalized for security proof of Chaum’s
blind signature scheme and Boldyreva blind signature
scheme respectively, the 1m-BDHI-1 and 1m-BDHI-2 are
also formalized for security proof for the two proposed
IBBS schemes.
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Definition 4 (1m-BDHI-1 Assumption): Let e : G1 ×
G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing, where G1 and G2 be
groups of prime order q and P be a generator of G1. Let
x, y be random elements in Zq and let X = xP, Y = yP .
The adversary A is given (e,G1, G2, q, P,X, Y ) and has
access to two oracles.
• The first one is a target oracle T O that returns a
random point Z ∈ G1 for each time it is invoked (it
takes no inputs).
• The second one is the helper oracle HO which takes
as input the value Z ∈ G1, and returns S, T ∈ G1
randomly from
{(S, T )|e(S, T ) = e(xyP,Z)}.
Additionally, this help oracle HO returns a piece of
auxiliary information R which satisfies the equations
e(R,S) = e(xP, yP ) and e(R,Z) = e(P, T ).
Here note that R is the proof for the equation
e(S, T ) = e(Y, Z)x. In fact, suppose that R = rP .
Then the above two equations imply the following
two equations:
S = r−1xyP and T = rZ.
So we have e(S, T ) = e(xyP,Z) = e(Y, Z)x.
We say that A wins if its output is a sequence of
points S1, T1, . . . , Sn, Tn ∈ G1 satisfying e(S1, T1) =
e(xyP,Z1), . . . , e(Sn, Tn) = e(xyP,Zn), where all d-
ifferent Z1, . . . , Zn are random points returned by T O
and the number of queries made by A to its helper oracle
HO, is strictly less than n. The 1m-BDHI-1 advantage of
A, denoted Adv1m−BDHI−1A (k), is the probability that
A wins, taken over the coins used in the generation of
(e,G1, GT , q, P,X, Y ), the coins of A, and the coins
used by the target oracle across its invocations. We say
that the one-more BDHI problem is hard if the function
Adv1m−BDHI−1A (k) is negligible for all polynomial-time
adversaries A.
Remark 2: Note that in Definition 4, we require that
the adversary A should output multiple pairs (Si, Ti)
corresponding to random Zi’s which are selected by the
target oracle T O, rather than A itself. Otherwise, 1m-
BDHI-1 assumption were invalid. The reason is that for
fixed X = xP and Y = yP , if given a pair (S, T )
satisfying e(S, T ) = e(xyP,Z), A can trivially create
a new pair (S′, T ′) satisfying e(S′, T ′) = e(xyP,Z ′)
by setting S′ = aS, T ′ = bT , and Z ′ = abZ, where
a, b ∈R Zq are random numbers selected by A.
Definition 5 (1m-BDHI-2 Assumption): Let e : G1 ×
G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing, where G1 and G2 be
groups of prime order q and P be a generator of G1. Let
x, y be random elements in Zq and let X = xP, Y = yP .
The adversary A is given (e,G1, G2, q, P,X, Y ) and has
access to two oracles.
• The first one is a target oracle T O that returns a
random point from G1 for each time it is invoked (it
takes no inputs).
• The second one is the helper oracle HO which given
Z ∈ G1, returns S, T ∈ G1 randomly from
{(S, T )| e(S,Z)e(Y,T ) = e(xyP,Z)}.
Additionally, this help oracle HO returns a piece of
auxiliary information R such that
e(P, S) = e(R+ xP, yP ) and e(R,Z) = e(P, T ).
Hence R is the proof for the equation e(S,Z)e(Y,T ) =
e(xyP,Z). In fact, suppose that R = rP for some
r. Then the above two equations imply the following
two equations:






We say that A wins if its output is a sequence of
points S1, T1, . . . , Sn, Tn ∈ G1 satisfying e(S1,Z1)e(Y,T1) =
e(xyP,Z1), . . . ,
e(Sn,Zn)
e(Y,Tn)
= e(xyP,Zn) where all differ-
ent Z1, . . . , Zn are random points returned by T O and
the number of queries made by A to its helper oracle
HO, is strictly less than n. The 1m-BDHI-2 advantage
of A, denoted Adv1m−BDHI−2A (k), is the probability that
A wins, taken over the coins used in the generation of
(e,G1, GT , q, P,X, Y ), the coins of A, and the coins
used by the target oracle across its invocations. We say
that the one-more BDHI problem is hard if the function
Adv1m−BDHI−2A (k) is negligible for all polynomial-time
adversaries A.
For BDHI-1, BDHI-2, 1m-BDHI-1, 1m-BDHI-2, it is
easy to see:
Fact 2: The hard problems of BDHI-1, BDHI-2, 1m-
BDHI-1 and 1m-BDHI-2 have the trapdoor xyP .
In the definitions of 1m-BDHI-1 assumption and 1m-
BDHI-2 assumption respectively, (S, T ) is randomly cho-
sen from the set {(S, T )| e(S,Z)e(Y,T ) = e(xyP,Z)} and
{(S, T )| e(S,Z)e(Y,T ) = e(xyP,Z)} which are of order q. So
we have:
Fact 3: In the assumptions of 1m-BDHI-1 and 1m-
BDHI-2, the output (S, T ) is statically independent of
the trapdoor xyP .
Based on Facts 1, 2, 3 and comparison with other as-
sumptions, we can confidently say that the assumptions of
BDHI-1, BDHI-2, 1m-BDHI-1, 1m-BDHI-2 are plausible
and reasonable. In fact, Fact 1 shows BDHI-1 (DBHI-
2) problem is not easier than the famous BDH problem.
As extending RSA assumption or CDH asusmption to
their one-more version, we analogously extended BDHI-
1 (BDHI-2) to 1m-BDHI-1 (BDHI-2) and then assume
that it is intractable too. Furthermore, Fact 2 and Fact
3 shows the 1m-BDHI assumption seems a better com-
putational assumption in the one-more version, since the
answer provided to the adversary is independent of the
the trapdoor. In contrast, for the 1m-RSA assumption
or 1m-CDH assumption, the answer is dependent on the
trapdoor, although it is infeasible to compute the trapdoor
from given answer.
Remark 3: It may be better to provide more formal
arguments for 1m-BDHI-1 and 1m-BDHI-2, as one re-
viewer suggested. However, I find that it seems somewhat
difficult to do so. If it is not very difficult to completely
formally explain the hardness of one more computation-
al problems, then the security proof of Chaum’s blind
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signatures would not remain open for so long time [5].
Furthermore, almost all previous works relative to one-
more computational assumptions [4]–[6], [8], [10] did
not provide the formal arguments such as formal analysis
in the generic group model. In fact, to provide the
formal analysis in the generic group model, it is usual to
provide a reduction between the object assumption and the
supporting assumption. However, according the results of
[10], it is very unlike to provide such reduction. Hence,
maybe we should leave as an open problem to provide
formal arguments for all existing one-more computational
assumptions including 1m-BDHI-1 and 1m-BDHI-2.
Finally, we review the ROS problem.
Definition 6 (ROS Problem [35]): Given an oracle
random function F : Zlq → Zq , find coefficients ak,i ∈ Zq
and a solvable system of l + 1 distinct equations (1) in
the unknowns c1, c2, . . . , cl over Zq:
ak,1c1+. . .+ak,lcl = F (ak,1, . . . , ak,l), for k = 1, 2, . . . , t.
(1)
Accordingly, the ROS assumption states that: there is no
PPT algorithm that can solve the ROS problem with non-
negligible probability.
To analyze the security of Schnorr’s blind signature
scheme, Schnorr [35] introduced the ROS-problem and
shows that one-more-forgeries in the parallel attack for
Schnorr’s blind signature scheme is equivalent to solving
the ROS-problem in the generic group model and random
oracle model. Wagner [36] solves the ROS-problem for
l + 1 = 2t in O(2tq
1
(t+1) )-average time and space by a
tree-like general birthday method. For t = 9, |G| = 2160,
this attack succeeds in O(225) average time performing
29−1 parallel interactions with the signer. Consequently,
it seems that we need a group of order q > 21600 if we
wish to enjoy 80-bit security. In other words, the size of
the group order in bits must be an order of magnitude
larger than one might otherwise expect from the best
currently-known algorithms for discrete logs in elliptic
curve groups. So the ROS assumption is not so plausible
and we should try to avoid using it when designing blind
signature schemes.
III. SECURITY MODEL OF ID-BASED BLIND
SIGNATURES
This section formally describes the syntax of ID-based
blind signatures (Definition 7), and the two security
requirements, i.e., blindness (Definition 8) and unforge-
ability (Definition 9).
Definition 7: An identity-based blind signature scheme
IBBS can be described as a collection of the following
four components (i.e. algorithms or protocols):
• Setup. This algorithm is run by the trusted party
called PKG on input a security parameter, and gen-
erates the public parameters params of the scheme
and a master secret. PKG publishes params and
keeps the master secret to itself.
• Extract. Given an identity ID, the master secret
and params, this algorithm generates the private key
DID of ID.
• Issue. The signer blindly issues a signature for
the user by this protocol, which is often divid-
ed into three sub-protocols or algorithms (Blind,
BSign,Unblind):
– Blind. Given the message m and a random string
r, it outputs the blinded message m′ and sends
it the signer. In this process, the user sometimes
needs the interactive help from the signer.
– BSign. Given the blinded message m′ and the
signer’s private signing key DID as the input,
it outputs a blind signature σ′ and sends it to
the user. This procedure may be an interactive
sub-protocol between the user and the signer.
– Unblind. Given a signature σ′ and the previous
used random string r, it outputs the unblinded
signature σ.
• Verify. Given a signature σ, a message m, an identity
ID and params, this algorithm outputs 1 if σ is a
valid signature on m for identity ID, or 0 otherwise.
The security of an ID-based blind signature scheme
consists of two requirements: the blindness property and
the unforgeability of additional signatures. We say a
blind signature scheme is secure if it satisfies these two
requirements.
Definition 8 (Blindness): Let A be a probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary which plays the role of the
signer, U0 and U1 be two honest users. U0 and U1
engage in the blind signature issuing protocol with A on
messages mb and m1−b, and output signatures σb and
σ1−b, respectively, where b ∈ {0, 1} is a random bit
chosen uniformly. (m0,m1, σb, σ1−b) are sent to A and
then A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. For all such A, U0 and U1,
for any constant c, and for sufficiently large n,
|Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| < n−c.
To define unforgeability, let us introduce the following
game among the adversary A which plays the role of the
user, and the challenger C which plays the role of the
honest signer.
• Setup. The challenger C takes a security parameter
1k and runs the algorithm Setup to generate common
public parameters params and also the master secret
key s. C sends params to A.
• Queries. The adversary A can perform a polynomi-
ally bounded number of queries in a concurrent and
interleaving way as follows.
– Hash function query. If the security is analyzed
in the random oracle model [7], C computes the
values of the hash functions for the requested
input and sends the values to A.
– Extract query. A chooses an identity ID and
sends it to C. C computes Extract(ID) = DID
and sends the result to A.
– Issue query. A chooses an identity ID, a plain-
text m. To blindly obtain a signature on m with
respect to ID, A engages in the blind signature
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issuing protocol with C in a concurrent and
interleaving way.
• Forgery. A wins the game if A outputs n valid
signatures (m1, σ1), . . ., (mn, σn) with respect to the
identity ID∗ such that
– mi = mj for any pair (i, j), where i = j i, j ∈
{1, . . . , n}.
– n is strictly larger than the number of the
executions (with respect to the identity ID∗) of
the protocol Issue between C and A.
– A has not made an extract query on the identity
ID∗.
The advantage AdvunforgeIBBS of A is defined as the
probability that it wins the above game, taken over the
coin tosses made by C,A, Setup. In the above attack
model, A is called one-more forger under parallel chosen
message and ID attacks.
Definition 9 (Unforgeability): An adversary A
(t, qE , qS , ε)-breaks an ID-based blind signature scheme,
if (1) A runs in time at most t, (2) A queries private keys
for at most qE identities and execute at most qS times
the blind signature issuing protocol, (3) AdvunforgeIBBS is
at least ε. We say an ID-based blind signature scheme
is (t, qE , qS , ε)-secure against one-more forgery under
parallel chosen message and ID attacks if no adversary
A (t, qE , qS , ε)-breaks the scheme.
Remark 4: In the forgery step of the above attack game,
if (mi, σi) = (mj , σj) instead of mi = mj holds for
message-signature pairs output by the adversary, then
we get the definition of the strong unforgeability of
blind signature schemes. As mentioned in [11], for the
main application of blind signatures, i.e., electronic cash,
unforgeability (rather than strong unforgeability) suffices.
In fact, the above forger A against ID-based blind
signatures is the natural analogy of the one-more forger
under parallel attack which is the most powerful attack
for blind signatures.
IV. FIRST CONSTRUCTION: IBBS-I
Before describing the construction, we explain the basic
idea. The signer first transforms the ID-based private key
DID ∈ G1 into a temporary private key xID ∈ Zq and
publishes the corresponding public key xIDP . Addition-
ally, it also publishes x−1IDDID as the linking information
between xID ∈ Zq and DID. Then, by using similar
blind signature technique due to Boldyreva [8], we can
get the the first IBBS scheme: IBBS-I, which is described
in detail below.
• Setup. The Private Key Generator (PKG) generates
parameters and master keys as follows:
– generates groups G1 and G2 of prime order q
with bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G1 → G2;
– P R←− G1;
– s R←− Zq , Ppub = sP ;
– chooses cryptographic hash functions H1, H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1. The PKG’s public parameter is
params = (G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2); its
master secret is s ∈ Zq .
• Extract. The signer with identity ID receives the
value DID = sQID from the PKG as its private
key, where QID = H1(ID) ∈ G1.
• Issue.
– Blind. The user randomly chooses a number
r1 ∈ Zq as the blinding factor, computes P ′m =
r1H2(m) and sends it to the signer.
– BSign. The signer sends back (A′, B′, C ′),
where A′ = xIDP ′m, B




– Unblind. First, the user verifies the blind signa-
ture (A′, B′, C ′) by checking whether
e(A′, P ) = e(P ′m, C
′) and e(QID, Ppub) =
e(B′, C ′).
Next, the user selects a random number r2 ∈ Zq




′, B = r−12 B
′, C = r2C ′.
• Verify. Let (A,B,C) be the signature on the mes-
sage m and Pm = H2(m). The verifier checks that:
e(A,P ) = e(Pm, C) and e(QID, Ppub) = e(B,C).
Correctness. If an entity with identity ID blindly issues
a signature σ = (A,B,C) on a message m to a user as
described in the Issue protocol above, it is easy to see that
σ will be accepted by a verifier:
e(A,P ) = e(r2r
−1
1 A





1 xIDr1Pm, P )




e(B,C) = e(r−12 B
′, r2C ′)
= e(B′, C ′)
= e(x−1IDDID, xIDP )
= e(DID, P ) = e(QID, sP )
= e(QID, Ppub).
In fact, we can see that a valid signature σ for
a message m has the following form: (A,B,C) =
(rH2(m), r
−1DID, rP ), where r ∈R Zq .
Similarly, it is easy to show that the blind signature
generated by the honest signer in Bsign must be accepted
by the user in the step Unblind.
Remark 5: After we submitted this work to ePrint
(archive 2007-007), Sherman S.M. Chow informed us
that the ID-based signature scheme implied by our above
IBBS scheme is similar to the ID-based signature scheme
due to him [16]. As we stated in Introduction, our IBBS
scheme is motivated by solving some open problems relat-
ed to ID-based blind signature schemes (see also the basic
idea described at the beginning of this section), while the
ID-based signature scheme in [16] is proposed as one of
applications of the so-called verifiable pairing. Moreover,
our IBBS scheme also implies a new construction of
verifiable paring.
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V. SECURITY PROOF OF IBBS-I
We first show that our scheme IBBS-I meets the
property of blindness. Intuitively, this is true due to the
fact that the signer receives only random elements in G1,
which are independent of the outputs of the user.
Theorem 5.1: The proposed ID-based blind signature
scheme IBBS-I is blind.
Proof. The blindness property will be proved accord-
ing to Definition 6. We assume that when the sig-
nature σb = (Ab, Bb, Cb) on the message mb (resp.
σ1−b = (A1−b, B1−b, C1−b) on m1−b) is generated,
the user U0 (resp. U1) sends P ′mb (resp. P ′m1−b ) to the
















For σb, if we can prove that there exist two integers
r′1, r
′
2 ∈ Zq such that
P ′m1−b = r
′
















then it is obtained that for the adversary, σb may
be linked to the process relative to the messages






1−b) and the user U1. In other
words, the adversary A can not determine which of the
two user generated the signature σb.








e(Ab, P ) = e(Pmb , Cb), e(QID, Ppub) = e(Bb, Cb);











1−b ∈ Zq be integers satisfying Cb = cbP ,
C ′1−b = c
′
1−bP respectively. By the bilinear property of
the pairing, then we have








































Next, we analyze the unforgeability of the scheme
IBBS-I as follows. Here note that it is obvious that our
blind signature scheme is not strongly unforgeable (see
Remark 1 in Section 3). Instead, we will prove that its
security satisfies the standard definition given in Section
3. As in [12], the proof is divided into two steps.
Consider the following variant of the attacking game
for unforgeability in Section 3. First we fix an identity
ID∗. In Setup Step, C gives to A system parameters
together with ID∗, and in Step Forgery, A must output
the given ID∗ (together with n pairs (mi, σi)) as its
final result. If no polynomial time algorithm A has
non-negligible advantage in this game, we say that the
blind signature scheme is secure against one-more forgery
under parallel chosen message and given ID attacks. The
first step of our proof is to reduce the problem to this
case.
Lemma 5.1: For the IBBS scheme IBBS-1, if there is
a one-more forger A0 under a parallel chosen message
and ID attack with running time t0 and advantage ε0,
then there is a one-more forger A1 under a parallel chosen
message and given ID attack, which has running time
t1 ≤ t0 and advantage ε1 ≥ ε0(1− 1q )/qH1 , where qH1 is
the maximum number of queries to H1 asked by A0.
In addition, the numbers of queries to hash functions,
Extract, and Issue asked by A1 are the same as those of
A0.
Proof. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that
for any ID, A0 queries H1(ID) and Extract(ID) at most
once. Let the fixed identity for A1 be ID∗. Our algorithm
A1 is as follows:
• Choose r ∈ {1, . . . , qH1} randomly. Denote by IDi
the input of the i-th query to H1 asked by A0. Let
ID′i be ID
∗ if i = r, and IDi otherwise. De-
fine H ′1(IDi),Extract









• Run A0 with the given system parameters. A1 re-
sponds to A0’s queries to H1, H2, Extract, and
Issue by evaluating H ′1, H2, Extract
′, and Issue′,
respectively. Let the output of A0 be n valid signa-
tures (m1, σ1), . . . , (mn, σn) with respect to IDout,
where n is strictly larger than the number of execu-
tions of the Issue’ protocol.
• If IDout = ID∗, then output n valid signa-
tures (m1, σ1), . . . , (mn, σn) together with the cor-
responding identity ID∗. Otherwise output fail.
Since the distributions produced by H ′1,Extract
′, and
Issue′ are indistinguishable from those produced by
H1,Extract, and Issue of our scheme, A0 learns nothing
from query results, and hence
Pr[A0 succeeds] ≥ ε0.
Since H1 is a random oracle, if A0 has not made the the
query H ′1(IDout), the probability that the A0’s output is
valid is negligible. Explicitly,
Pr[IDout = IDi for some i|A0 succeeds] ≥ 1− 1q .
Since r is independently and randomly chosen, we have
Pr[IDout = IDr = ID




Pr[A1 succeeds] ≥ ε0(1− 1q ) 1qH1
as desired. 
Lemma 5.2: For the IBBS scheme IBBS-1, if there is
a one-more forger A under a parallel chosen message and
given ID attack with running time t1 and advantage ε1,
then there is an adversary B attacking the one-more BDHI
problem, which has running time t2 ≤ t1 + 4cG1(qH1 +
qH2 + qS + qE) and advantage ε2 ≥ ε1, where cG1 is a
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constant that depends on G1, and qH1 , qH2 , qE , qS are the
numbers of queries to the hash functions H1, H2, Extract,
and Issue asked by A1 respectively.
Proof. Suppose that A is a one-more forger against
our scheme under a parallel chosen message and giv-
en ID attack. We describe the algorithm B which will
simulate the challenger for A in order to solve the
one-more BDHI problem. The adversary B is given
(e,G1, G2, q, P,X, Y ), the target oracle and the helper
oracle. B simulates the challenger and interacts with
forger A as follows.
• Setup. B first provides A with the public parameter
(e,G1, G2, q, P, Ppub) and the fixed identity ID
∗,
where Ppub = X .
• H1-queries. To respond to these queries, B main-
tains a list of tuples (IDi, H1(IDi), ri) as explained
below. We refer to this list as H1-list. The list is
initially empty. When A queries the oracle H1 at an
identity IDi, B responds as follows.
– If the query IDi appears on the H1-list in a tu-
ple (IDi, H1(IDi), ri) (or (IDi, H1(IDi), ∗)),
then B responds with H1(IDi).
– If IDi = ID∗, B sets H1(IDi) = Y and
sends it to A. Additionally, B appends the tuple
(IDi, H1(IDi), ∗) to the H1-list.
– If IDi = ID∗, B randomly selects ri ∈ Zq
and sends H1(IDi) = riP to A. Additionally,
B appends the tuple (IDi, H1(IDi), ri) to the
H1-list.
Since H1 is a random oracle, A obtains no informa-
tion on H1(ID) before he queries the H1-oracle on
ID. So, without loss of generality, we assume that
A has already queried the H1 oracle on an identity
ID before he makes the issue query or extract query
with respect to the ID.
• H2-queries. When given the new query mj , that is
distinct from the previous hash queries, B obtains a
point Zj ∈ G as the hash value H2(mj) from its
target oracle T O and sends it to A.
• Extract queries. Suppose that A makes an ex-
tract query on the identity IDi = ID∗. Let
(IDi, H1(IDi), ri) be the tuple on the H1-list con-
taining IDi. B answers this query by sends to A
DIDi = riX . By assuming X = xP for some
unknown x, it is obvious that DIDi = xH1(IDi) =
riX , since H1(IDi) = riP .
• Issue queries. Assume that A chooses the identity
IDi and the plaintext mi and wants to blindly obtain
the signature on mi with respect to the identity IDi.
Note that the signer has only one move in the Issue
protocol. Let P ′mi be the blinded message that A
sends to B. B answer this query as follows.
– If IDi = ID∗, B computes the private key
DIDi = riX , where (IDi, H1(IDi), ri) is
the corresponding tuple on the H1-list. Then
B uses the private key DIDi to compute the
corresponding blinded signature as in BSign.
– If IDi = ID∗, B sends P ′mi to its helper
oracle HO. Let (Ri, Si, Ti) be the correspond-






′ = Ti, B′i = Si, C
′
i = Ri.
It is obvious that this simulated signature is valid
(see the algorithm Verifiy in Section 4).
• Outputs. At last, A outputs a list of message-
signature pairs ((m1, (A1, B1, C1)), . . .,
(mn, (An, Bn, Cn)) with respect to the identity
ID∗, where n is strictly larger than the number
of executions of the protocol Issue with respect
to the identity ID∗, and hence strictly larger
than the number of queries made by B to its
helper oracle HO. B outputs A1,B1,A2, B2,
. . ., An, Bn. Here note that a valid signature




x, and H2(mi) is
obtained from the target oracle. So the one-more
BDHI problem is solved by B.
It is easy to see that the view of A in the simulated
experiment is indistinguishable from its view in the
real experiment, and that B is successful only if A is
successful. Thus, the probability ε2 that B succeeds is at
least the probability ε1 that A succeeds. Algorithm B’s
running time is the same as A’s running time plus the
time it takes to respond to qH1 H1-hash queries, qH2 H2-
hash queries, qE extract queries and qS signature issue
queries. Each query requires at most four exponentiations
(corresponding to issue queries for IDi = ID∗) in
G1 which we assume takes time cG1 . Hence, the total
running time t2 is at most t1+4cG1(qH1 +qH2 +qS+qE)
as required. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Combing the above lemmas, we obtain the following
theorem:
Theorem 5.2: If the one-more BDHI assumption is
true in the group G1, then the proposed ID-based blind
signature scheme IBBS-I is secure against one-more
forgery under parallel chosen message and ID attacks in
the random oracle model.
VI. SECOND CONSTRUCTION: IBBS-II
In this section, we presents the second IBBS scheme:
IBBS-II, which is a result parallel to IBBS-I. It is de-
signed using the same basic idea used for constructing
IBBS-I. Roughly speaking, the signer first transforms the
private key DID ∈ G1 into the temporary private key
xID ∈ Zq and publishes the additional information xIDP ,
DID +xIDQID. Then, the blind signature technique due
to Boldyreva [8] is used to generate signatures blindly. As
IBBS-II is very similar to IBBS-I, we here only describe
the scheme and give the security results without details of
security proof. It is straightforward to adapt the security
proof of IBBS-I for IBBS-II.
IBBS-II is described as follows.
• Setup. The Private Key Generator (PKG) generates
parameters and master keys as follows:
– generates groups G1 and G2 of prime order q
with bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G1 → G2;
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– P R←− G1;
– s R←− Zq , Ppub = sP ;
– chooses cryptographic hash functions H1, H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1. The PKG’s public parameter is
params = (G1, G2, e, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2); its
master secret is s ∈ Zq .
• Extract. The signer with identity ID receives the
value DID = sQID from the PKG as its private
key, where QID = H1(ID) ∈ G1.
• Issue.
– Blind. The user randomly chooses a number
r1 ∈ Zq as the blinding factor, computes P ′m =
r1H2(m) and sends it to the signer.
– BSign. The signer sends back (A′, B′, C ′),
where A′ = xIDP ′m, B
′ = xIDQID +
DID, C
′ = xIDP, xID
R←− Zq .
– Unblind. First, the user verifies the blind signa-
ture (A′, B′, C ′) by checking whehter
e(A′, P ) = e(P ′m, C
′) and e(B′, P ) =
e(QID, Ppub + C
′).
Next, the user selects a random number r2 ∈ Zq
and computes the signature as (A,B,C), where
A = r2Pm + r
−1
1 A
′, B = r2QID + B′, C =
r2P + C
′, and Pm = H2(m).
• Verify. Let (A,B,C) be the signature on the mes-
sage m and Pm = H2(m). The verifier checks that:
e(A,P ) = e(Pm, C) and e(B,P ) =
e(QID, Ppub + C).
Correctness. If a blind signature σ = (A,B,C) on a
message m has been issued by following the above Issue
protocol, it is not difficult to see that
A = (r2 + xID)Pm, B = (r2 + xID + s)QID,
and C = (r2 + xID)P ).
By letting r = r2 + xID mod q, we can see that a valid
signature σ has the form (A,B,C) = (rPm, rQID +
DID, rP ). Then, the signature verification equations are
justified by
e(A,P ) = e(rPm, P ) = e(Pm, rP ) = e(Pm, C), and
e(B,P ) = e(rQID +DID, P ) = e(QID, (r + s)P )
= e(QID, Ppub + C).
Theorem 6.1: The proposed ID-based blind signature
scheme IBBS-II is blind.
Theorem 6.2: If the one-more BDHI-2 assumption
holds in the group G1, then the proposed ID-based blind
signature scheme IBBS-II is secure against one-more
forgery under parallel chosen message and ID attacks in
the random oracle model.
Remark 6: From the above descriptions given in Sections
4, 5, and 6, we can see that IBBS-I and IBBS-II are very
similar with regarding to their structures, efficiency and
security. The underlying computational assumptions, i.e.,
BDHI-1 and BDHI-2, are close to each other but they may
be different (More exactly, as mentioned in Remark 1 we
do not know if they implies each other or not). Since a
small but subtle difference on computational assumptions
may result in essential impact on the real security of
cryptosystems, we believe that such paralleling work like
BDHI-1 and BDHI-2 are also interesting.
VII. COMPARISON BETWEEN IBBS-I AND OTHER
IBBS SCHEME
Table 1. Efficiency Comparison of ID-based Blind
Signatures
Schemes Signer User Verifier Move Signature Size
Our IBBS-I 3M (1M)* 4M+4e 4e 2 3|q|
Our IBBS-II 3M (1M)* 4M+4e 4e 2 3|q|
ZK02 [37] 3M 3M+3e 1E+2e 3 3|q|
ZK03 [38] 2M 4M+2e 1M+2e 3 2|q|
HCW05 [25] 2M+1e 1M+3E+3e 1M+2e 3 2|q|
PO09 [31] 2M 3M+4e+ * 4e 2+* 3|q|
Schnorr [32], [35] 1E 3E 2E 4 2|q|+Cert
Chaum [13], [21] 1E 2E 2E 4 |n|+Cert
Boldyreva [8], [21] 1M 2M+4e 4e 4 |q|+Cert
CKW04 [11], [21] 25E 38E 2E 10 |p| + 2|q|+Cert
KZ05 [21], [28] 5M+10E+6e 7M+15E+18e 1M+6e 6 3|q|+Cert
Okamoto [21], [30] 6M+3E 10M+5E+4e 3M+4e 6 |p| + 2|q|+Cert
Fischlin [20], [21] 1E NIZK NIZK 4 NIZK+Cert
*: In IBBS-I and IBBS-II, fixed B′, C′ can be used by the signer. “*” is the time and rounds number for the
proof knowledge with 21 variables.
In this Section, we give a comprehensive comparison of
ID-based blind signatures (IBBS) (see Table 1 and Table 2
below for details). The purpose is to show the advantages
of our schemes IBBS-I and IBBS-II compared with ex-
isting solutions. Namely, they are first two round-optimal
ID-base blind signature schemes, which are secure against
generic parallel attack without relying on the intractability
of ROS problem.
Table 1 compares the efficiency of ID-based blind
signatures. First of all, we remark that the first five
schemes (including our two constructions) in Table 1
are explicit IBBS schemes, while all other schemes are
deduced from the underlying blind signatures by using
the certificate-based generic transformation [21], which
extends the result given in [3]. More specifically, we
get these ID-based blind signature schemes from the
corresponding blind signatures [8], [11], [13], [20], [30],
[32], [35]. As the main computational overheads, we only
consider modular exponentiations (denote by E), scalar
multiplications (denote by M), and bilinear mappings
(denote by e). Since simultaneous exponentiations can be
efficiently carried out by means of an exponent array, for









just one single exponentiation. To count the computational
costs of the signer, user and verifier in the above deduced
IBBS schemes, we assume the PKG use a similar under-
lying signature to issue certificates for signers. That is,
the PKG uses Schnorr signature in the ID-based blind
Schnorr signature [35], the RSA signature with a full
domain hash in the ID-based Chaum [13] and CKW04
[11] blind signature schemes, and the BLS short signature
[9] in the ID-based Boldyreva [8], KZ [28], and Okamoto
[30] blind signature schemes. For the generic scheme
proposed by Fishlin [20], there are no concrete values
since his scheme relies on general NIZK to prove the
correctness of a ciphertext. Due to the usage of certificates
in Galindo et al.’s approach, the round complexity, the
communication complexity and the signature size are also
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increased in all deduced IBBS schemes. For example,
though the standard blind signature schemes in [8], [13],
[20] are round-optimal (i.e., they are one-round or 2-
move solutions), the correspond ID-based blind signatures
become 4-move schemes.
Note that Galindo et al.’s IBBS schemes can become
2-move if the user has already known the public key of
the signer during an execution of the underlying blind
signing protocol. The reason is that in this case, with the
knowledge of the signer’s (“ID-based”) public key the
signature requesting user can send the blinded message to
the signer in the first round of signature issuing protocol.
The IBBS scheme based on pairings due to Galindo et
al. is an example for this case. In addition, as stated
in Introduction we point out again that the functional
limitations in Galind et al.’s generic approach are avoided
in our scheme. In other words, compared with our IBBS
schemes, Galindo et al.’s IBBS schemes can not be seen
as “fully ID-based”.
Table 2. Security Comparison of ID-based Blind
Signatures
Schemes ROM or SM No CRS No ROS Assumptions Proofs
Our IBBS-I ROM Yes Yes 1m-BDHI-1 Yes
Our IBBS-II ROM Yes Yes 1m-BDHI-2 Yes
ZK02 [37] ROM Yes No CDH No
ZK03 [38] ROM Yes No CDH No
HCW05 [25] ROM Yes No CDH No
PO09 [31] SM NO NO CDH Yes
Schnorr [32], [35] ROM Yes No DL Yes
Chaum [13], [21] ROM Yes Yes 1m-RSA Yes
Boldyreva [8], [21] ROM Yes Yes 1m-CDH Yes
CKW04 [11], [21] SM No Yes SRSA Yes
KZ05 [21], [28] SM No Yes DLDH+LRSW Yes
Okamoto [21], [30] SM No Yes 2SDH+DCR Yes
Fischlin [20], [21] SM No Yes GC Yes
On the security comparison of ID-based blind sig-
natures, we mainly consider the following five aspects
(Refer to Table 2): (1) whether the scheme is secure in the
random oracle model (ROM) or standard model (SM); (2)
whether a scheme does not need common reference string
(CRS); (3) whether a scheme does not rely on the ROS
assumption; (4) what the computational assumptions are
required; and (5) whether rigorous security proofs have
provided. According to Table 2, we can see that the last
four schemes are all provably secure in the standard model
but need common reference strings. At the same time,
these schemes are not very efficient, since in the blind
signature issuing protocols some kinds of zero knowledge
proofs are involved (Check Table 1). In addition, note
that the CKW04 scheme is only claimed to be secure in
the scenario of sequential attacks, which are weaker than
generic parallel attacks. The directly constructed schemes
in [25], [37], [38] are computationally efficient, but their
security against one-more forgery is not formally proved
even under the ROS assumption. Based on the result in
[21], [32], [35], the ID-based Schnorr blind signature
scheme is secure against one-more forgery, but needs
the ROS assumption, which leads to the loss of practical
efficiency. That is, to guarantee the 80-bit security one has
to select q as large as 1600 bits. Compared with efficient
ID-based blind signatures deduced from [8], [13], both of
our two scheme are round-optimal (i.e. two moves rather
than 4 moves) and have shorter signatures (without using
a certificate to binding a random public key with each
signer).
Now, we compare the computational assumptions. The
IBBS schemes proposed in [37], [38], [25] all rely on the
CDH assumption. In contrast, the security of our schemes
IBBS-I and IBBS-II are based on two one-more BDHI
assumptions which are one-more versions of two BDHI
assumptions. According to Fact 1, the BDHI assumptions
are stronger than the CDH assumption. So, these three
schemes seems better than ours as they need a weaker
assumption. However, as just mentioned the security of
all these schemes rely on the ROS assumption and formal
security results are not yet established. Therefore, they
are not useable in practice due to both efficiency and
uncertain security. Additionally, He et al. [24] recently
propose a new IBBS scheme without pairings. Since it
follows the Schnorr’s construction method as formalized
in [32], [33], [35], it remains to be disadvantageous in
terms of round efficiency (3 rounds) and assumptions
(ROS).
On the other hand, Fact 1 states that BDHI assumptions
are weaker than the well-known bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(BDH) assumption. Literature [2] argued that a 160-bit
q can ensure the difficulty of the BDH problem on the
bilinear group G1 of order q. In [5], the one-more-RSA-
inversion problem and its analogues are fully discussed.
These discussions of [5] can be straightforwardly extend-
ed to the case of one-more-BDHI problems. So, although
the one-more BDHI assumptions are stronger than the
relative BDHI assumptions, it seems reasonable to believe
that the 160-bit q is enough to ensure the difficulty of the
1m-BDHI problems on the bilinear group G1 of order
q. Due to this reason, our schemes based on 160-bit q-
order bilinear groups will be dramatically efficient than
the previous analogues [25], [37], [38], which should need
to be based on 1600-bit q-order bilinear groups. So we can
claim that our IBBS-I and IBBS-II are the first practical
ID-based blind signature schemes from pairings. In addi-
tion, note that these discussions also apply to the ID-based
blind signature derived from Schnorr [32], [35] via using
Galindo et al.’s generic transformation [21], as Schnorr
blind signature also relies on the ROS assumption though
it only need a further weaker computational assumption,
i.e., discrete logarithm (DL) assumption.
ID-based blind signatures derived from Chaum [13]
and Boldyreva [8] require one-more RSA (1m-RSA)
and one-more CDH (1m-CDH) assumptions. Due to the
above discussions, originated from [2], [5], these are
two plausible assumptions and hence the corresponding
IBBS schemes can guarantee security in using practical
parameters. However, as shown in Table 1 they are not
round-optimal and the resulting signatures are longer than
ours, due to the attached certificate issued by the PKG.
Similarly, the last four ID-based blind signatures in Table
2 are not very efficient in aspects of computation, round
complexity, and signature size. In addition, they rely on
common reference strings, though they are all provably
secure in standard model. With regarding to computation-
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al assumptions, CKW04 [11] requires the Strong RSA
(SRSA) assumption; KZ05 [28] the Lysyanskaya-Rivest-
Sahai-Wolf (LRSW) assumption [29], the Decisional Lin-
ear Diffie-Hellman (DLDH) assumption, and Decisional
Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption; Okamoto [30]
the 2-variable Strong Diffie-Hellman (2SDH) assumption
and DCR assumption; and Fischlin [20] the general com-
plexity (GC) assumptions, like the existence of trapdoor
permutations. So, Fischlin’s scheme needs the weakest
assumption but it is also the most inefficient one as
general non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs
are involved to show the correctness of blind signatures.
Here note the computational efficiency advantage of
our schemes over the others holds under the condition
that the gap between the BDHI problems and the 1m-
BDHI problems can be neglected. Therefore, it is an
interesting but technically difficult topic to formally dis-
cuss the gap between a computational problem and its
one-more version, such as CDH vs one-more CDH. In
fact, in [15], Cheon showed that for a special GDH (Gap
Diffie-Hellman) group (Note that not all GDH groups),
a greater order is needed to ensure the security of the
blind signature scheme proposed in [8]. This result can
be also easily extended to our scheme based on the special
bilinear group. However, we can also avoid to choose this
special bilinear group, if we do not want to use a greater
order q.
Remark 7: We are especially grateful to one reviewer of
Pairing 2008 who pointed out that one IBBS scheme from
the generic construction [21], with some improvements,
could also be round-optimal and more efficient than our
scheme. However, we remark that such a scheme with
these potential improvements is not mentioned in [21],
though this scheme mentioned by the referee is very
interesting and deserves further study. In addition, as
stated in Section 1, both the motivation and method of
our work are different from that in [21].
VIII. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
First, the new formalized 1m-BDHI-1 and 1m-BDHI-2
assumptions may be of independent interest, since other
recently proposed computation assumptions in one-more
flavor, such as one-more-RSA-inversion [5], one-more
CDH [8], one-more discrete logarithm [4], have found
many applications in provable security for blind signatures
[5], [8], transitive signatures [4], identification protocols
[6] and so on.
Second, the underlying ID-based signature schemes of
IBBS-I and IBBS-II may be of independent interest, since
they do not use the proof of knowledge paradigm and has
a loose algebraic structure. Without using the proof of
knowledge paradigm enables us to avoid employing the
forking lemma [32] in the security proofs and hence we
can get tighter security reductions. The efficiency is also
satisfactory, as we can use fixed the values of B and C
in a signature so that to generate a signature only one
scalar multiplication should be performed. Furthermore,
the good algebraic structure of our schemes is an advan-
tageous property and may deserve more attentions than
other ID-based signature schemes. Since this property
already enables the efficient extensions to blind signa-
tures, other functionalities, such as threshold signatures
and aggregate signatures, could also be constructed ef-
ficiently. We note that the underlying ID-based signature
schemes are not strongly unforgeable, but satisfy the well-
known standard definition of existential unforgeability.
However, a non-strongly unforgeable signature may have
some advantages over the strongly unforgeable one. For
example, the authors of [23] constructed the first constant-
length ID-based aggregate signature scheme from an non-
strongly unforgeable ID-based signature scheme.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed two secure and practical one-
round identity-based blind signature (IBBS) schemes from
bilinear pairings without resorting to the ROS assumption.
This means that the proposed constructions are not only
optimal in the sense of round complexity, but also prac-
tically efficient in contrast to existing solutions proposed
in [25], [37], [38], which are actually inefficient due to
the requirement of a great-order group for ensuring the
difficulty of ROS problem. Compared with other identity-
based blind signature schemes that can be deduced from a
generic result [21], our IBBS schemes are more efficient
in terms of round-complexity, computation, and signa-
ture size. Furthermore, our ID-based signature schemes
avoid the restrictions which make Galindo’s generic con-
struction less “ID-based”. Different from previous IBBS
schemes, the proposed schemes are constructed from
scratch in terms of the underlying ID-based signature
schemes and the new assumptions which may be appli-
cable for constructing other primitives in pairing-based
cryptography. As the future work, several interesting top-
ics can be further investigated: (a) Constructing efficient
and secure IBBS schemes in the standard model without
the ROS assumption; (b) Study the relations between
computational assumptions, like BDHI-1 and BDHI-2,
BDHI-1 (2) and 1m-BDHI-1 (2); and (c) Explore more
applications of (1m-) BDHI-1 and (1m-) BDHI-2.
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